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Abstract This article explores the consequences of intergenerational social
mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. It is hypothesised that
those who experience improvements in socio-economic status through social
mobility are more likely to blame poverty on individual characteristics such as
laziness and lack of willpower and are less likely to attribute failure to injustice in
society, and on the macro-level, the effect of social mobility on perceptions of
popular explanations of poverty is moderated by contextual environment. The
described hypotheses are tested by using multinomial and multilevel logistic
regressions and two complementary datasets—European Values Studies and the
Life in Transition Survey. The derived findings suggest that social mobility is
indeed associated with perceptions of individual blame and social blame of why
some people are in need. However, these effects are manifested primarily among
subjectively mobile individuals and are also conditioned by the legacy of socialism
and the level of economic development of countries where individuals reside.
Keywords Intergenerational social mobility  Social justice  Subjective mobility 
Poverty explanations  Fairness  Multilevel analysis
Introduction
In achievement-oriented societies, attained socio-economic status results from
individuals’ abilities and efforts to improve their own lives. If in these societies, life
chances depend on ascribed factors rather than achieved ones, they are inherently
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unjust (Parsons & Shils, 1951). Low rate of intergenerational social mobility, which
refers to restricted movement upward or downward in the prevailing stratification
hierarchy, is considered as representing one of the most fundamental forms of
ascriptive inequality (see Blau & Duncan, 1967; Breen, 2004; Erikson &
Goldthorpe, 1992). Many existing studies on intergenerational social mobility are
motivated by the normative considerations of strong intergenerational links in socio-
economic status (Marshall & Swift, 1996; Marshall, Swift, & Roberts, 1997; Swift,
2000), but social mobility is not an end in itself and should be ‘‘informed as much
by an explanatory as a normative interest’’ (Swift, 2004, p. 1). One of the ways of
understanding social mobility for individuals’ lives is to analyse how the attitudes of
people with different mobility experiences vary. If we have to select among various
potential sets of attitudes related to social mobility, views on the determinants of life
chances are the obvious choice. The major question of this article is whether or not
individuals’ social mobility experience correlates with their perceptions of popular
explanations of poverty. The importance of public perceptions of poverty for
welfare state policies is widely recognised, but much more needs to be done for
understanding the multifaceted nature of public attitudes towards the poor (Kallio &
Niemela¨, 2014).
It is generally acknowledged, at least on theoretical level, that intergenerational
social mobility is an important explanation of attitudes towards inequalities (Jaime-
Castillo & Mareques-Perales, 2014; Wegener & Liebig, 1995). According to
Kluegel and Smith (1986), people who experience improvements in living standards
through social mobility are more likely to attribute their success to their own effort
and abilities. Although the exact reason for this tendency is unknown, it is believed
to be driven by various psychological mechanisms (Burger, 1981; Crocker & Park,
2004; Ross, 1977). To my knowledge, there are hardly any studies that empirically
investigate the links between intergenerational social mobility and perceptions of
popular explanations of poverty in large comparative perspective. Furthermore,
comparative research addressing implications of social mobility on individuals’
attitudes and behaviours rarely includes a large number of post-socialist societies.
This article not only contributes to the literature on the consequences of social
mobility and perceptions of popular explanations of poverty, but also inquiries
whether the strength of this link depends on countries’ contextual environment—the
legacy of socialism and economic development.
In addition, I also consider the effects of both objective intergenerational
occupational mobility and subjective self-reported mobility experience on attitudes
towards poverty determinants. The latter distinction is an important contribution to
the literature as the existing studies usually analyse independently either objective
or subjective mobility experiences. Individuals’ attitudes might be affected by
mobility only if they are conscious of their upward or downward mobility
experience. To address the research question of this article, I employ two
complementary large-scale datasets—European Values Studies (EVS) and the Life
in Transition Survey (LITS). I start with the short review of the theoretical
framework and corresponding micro- and macro-level hypotheses on the role of
mobility in attitudes towards the attributes of poverty. Particular attention is paid to
the utilised variables in the research design overview. The results section presents
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the empirical findings based on the conducted multivariate and multilevel analysis.
The final section summarises the results, discusses the problems of causality, and
briefly outlines the implications of findings for the policymaking realm.
Theoretical Framework
Scholarly interest in popular poverty attributions originates after the 1960s in
the USA, coinciding with the ‘‘War on Poverty’’ agenda initiated by President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. The earliest studies using formal factor
analysis distinguished between explanations concerned with socio-economic
influences, with personal responsibility, and with personal misfortune (Feagin,
1972; Feather, 1974). According to these findings, individualistic explanations put
responsibility for destitution on the poor themselves; structural explanations blame
the external and socio-economic forces for deprivation; fatalistic ideas perceive
poverty as the result of factors beyond individuals’ and social control. While this
approach simplifies the complexity of popular attributions of poverty (e.g. Morc¸o¨l,
1997; Smith & Stone, 1989), it still provides a comparatively validated classification
of popular explanations about the causes of poverty (Lepianka, Van Oorschot, &
Gelissen, 2009). Researchers usually find that individuals’ gender, education, labour
market status, social class, income, subjective experience of disadvantage, and
personal ideological convictions all play a role in attitudes towards poverty
determinants (Alston & Dean, 1972; Bucca, 2016; Feather, 1974; Kallio & Niemela¨,
2014; Kreidl, 2000; Niemela, 2008; Stephenson, 2000; Wegener, 2000; Zucker &
Weiner, 1993).
Self-Serving Bias in Causal Attribution, Objective Versus Subjective Social
Mobility
It is known that rational self-interest is one of the micro-level mechanisms that
affect attitudes towards life chances and inequality (Linos & West, 2003), but an
important social-psychological concept that may best explain why socially mobile
individuals differ in their understanding of the causes of poverty is the self-serving
bias in causal attribution (see Schmidt, 2011). Causal attribution refers to ‘‘the
process by which social perceivers arrive at causal explanations for their own, as
well as others’ behaviours’’ (Semin & Zwier, 1997, p. 55). The self-serving bias
implies that people are more likely to attribute failure to factors that are beyond their
control and more likely to explain successes by pointing to their own merits,
abilities, and effort. According to Miller and Ross (1975, p. 23), the self-serving bias
is related to individuals’ need to have control over their environment: ‘‘the
attribution to self of success and the attribution to external factors of failure
provides for the continuation of control attempts’’. The existing evidence clearly
indicates the pervasiveness of the self-serving attribution bias in various countries
and contexts and also suggests significant heterogeneity across societal groups
(Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).
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It is known that some individuals in a society believe that predetermined
circumstances are more decisive than one’s own effort in shaping life achievements,
but others are convinced that individual effort rather than ascribed circumstances is
the key to seizing life chances. The intra-family theoretical model, proposed by
Piketty (1995), assumes that these perceptions are largely affected by lifelong
experiences. Depending on their origin, individuals start with an initial set of
attitudes, but over the years these preferences are amended based on their
experience of intergenerational mobility and an associated self-serving perception
of the role that ascribed and attained factors play in determining success or failure.
What this means is that individuals who experience upward social mobility will be
more likely than non-mobile individuals to make internal attributions such as
laziness to describe individuals’ failure. We should expect downwardly mobile
individuals to make external attributions and to be more in favour of the notation
that individuals are not accountable for their own poverty. Furthermore, a
qualitative study of individuals in France suggests that upwardly mobile people
predominantly emphasise personal merit in their success (Duru-Bellat & Kieffer,
2008).
Since my empirical analysis deals with the links between social mobility and
attitudes, a distinction between objective upgrading in occupational status and
subjective perception of the intergenerational social mobility experience is of
primary importance. If the former can be measured by the association between
social background and occupational attainment, the latter can be investigated though
individuals’ qualitative assessment of their own social mobility experience (van den
Berg, 2011). Relationships between subjective and objective mobility are generally,
but not always, positive. The analysis of data for 30 nations which asked
respondents to compare their own occupational status with the status of their
father’s job indicated that objective intergenerational mobility had an important
effect on subjective mobility perceptions (Kelley & Kelley, 2009). On the other
hand, according to Segura (1989), some immigrants in the USA define their
mobility experience as upward, although it would qualify as downward according to
objective definitions of social mobility. Empirical evidence suggests that subjective
mobility is correlated with a broader set of socio-demographic factors (Evans &
Kelley, 2004). The first hypothesis of this paper that refers to both objective and
subjective social mobility takes the following form:
H1: (1a) Intergenerational upward social mobility positively associates with
attitudes that individuals are responsible for their own failure; (1b) intergenerational
upward social mobility negatively associates with attitudes that injustice in society
is responsible for people being in need.
Socialist Legacy and Economic Development
Existing research suggests that significant macro-level factors that affect individ-
uals’ perceptions of popular explanations of poverty are welfare state institutions,
social expenditure, economic growth, a country’s religious traditions, and level of
poverty (Kallio & Niemela¨, 2014; Kluegel, Mason, & Wegener, 1995; Lepianka,
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Gelissen, & van Oorschot, 2010). In this subsection, I review two macro-level
mechanisms which could moderate the effect of social mobility on individuals’
perceptions of poverty attributes. The legacy of socialism in Central and Eastern
Europe has been shown to exert a long-lasting effect on post-socialist economic and
political attitudes (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014). Perceptions of popular explana-
tions of poverty can stem from the idiosyncratic national characteristics and
distinctive historical legacies of these countries. One of the main findings of this
stream of the literature is that post-socialist societies overall have a higher tendency
to favour individual explanations of poverty (Kallio & Niemela¨, 2014). Fatalistic
explanations of poverty are also less common in this region (Kreidl, 2000; Lepianka
et al., 2010; Oorschot & Halman, 2000).
In addition to individual-level mobility experience, intergenerationally mobile
citizens of more fluid societies are more likely to have individualistic worldviews on
failure and success in life (Bucca, 2016). In the countries of the socialist bloc, more
ambitious de-stratification policies led to higher mobility rates which to this day
shape their intergenerational social mobility regimes (Gugushvili, 2014, 2015a;
Parkin, 1973). Indeed, one of the main conclusions of five decades of social
stratification and mobility research is that the fundamental determinants of life
chances are resistant to change (Hout & DiPrete, 2006). Socialist institutions and
individuals embedded in them are likely to have remained the source of post-
socialist reproduction and stratification through structural and economic inertia
(Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001). The latter is particularly important as the available
studies also suggest that a feedback mechanism exists between public attitudes in a
country and its economic and political institutions (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004;
Breznau, 2016; Linos & West, 2003).
In many post-socialist societies, the prevailing corrupt practices of resource
distribution have both disrupted socialist egalitarian policies and prompted the
emergence of crony capitalism (Smith, 2010). The latter could mean that the limited
role of the state in addressing social hardship facilitates the prevalence of
individualistic explanations among socially mobile individuals on why some people
in their society are in need (Bucca, 2016). One could also argue in the opposite
direction that individuals are likely to attribute poverty to the state in post-socialist
societies because the state does so little to address social hardships. However, the
reluctance of the elites, political leaders and opinion makers to support the new poor
by equally sharing the costs of the transition has been extensively demonstrated (see
Atal, 1999; Fodor, Wnuk-Lipinski, & Yershova, 1995; Szele´nyi & Szele´nyi, 1995).
It is also worth noting that the values underpinning policies that address poverty
such as equality or solidarity have become more de-legitimated in post-socialist
countries than they are in the developed democracies of Western Europe (Ferge,
1997).
A distinction between post-socialist countries and Western European democra-
cies is also important inasmuch as Kreidl (2000), in this journal, argued that in the
first years of post-socialist transition, the effect of upward social mobility in Eastern
European societies, among other explanations, was much less salient in explaining
poverty simply because upward social mobility was the exception. However, the
latest available comparative evidence suggests that no drastic changes have taken
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place in terms of social fluidity since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the levels
of upward intergenerational mobility remained quite high (Gugushvili, 2014;
Veraschagina, 2012). Therefore, Kreidl’s conclusion that social mobility in post-
socialist countries cannot affect the legitimisation of poverty as in the Western
welfare democracies needs to be re-examined. The following is the second
hypothesis of this article:
H2: The effect of intergenerational social mobility on attitudes towards the
determinants of poverty is stronger in post-socialist societies than it is in other
European societies.
The second macro-level hypothesis implies that perceptions of popular expla-
nations of poverty among socially mobile individuals are affected by the economic
performance of their countries (Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2013). More specifically, I
test the moderating effect of the macro-contextual variable—economic develop-
ment. A favourable macroeconomic context can facilitate individualistic beliefs not
only among socially mobile groups but also among all individuals because
economic growth is likely to be perceived as some sort of collective upward
mobility. Furthermore, upwardly mobile individuals in economically advanced
environments might have an extra reason to oppose structural explanations and
support individualistic explanations of poverty because economic development, on
average, provides greater opportunities to succeed in life (Weber, 1978). The links
between economic development and individualism, and therefore individualistic
explanations of poverty, preoccupied some of the most influential thinkers in social
science history. Examples include Smith’s (1817) invisible hand of an individu-
alistic society which leads to greater economic prosperity for all, and Max Weber’s
description of ‘‘the ability to free oneself from the common tradition, a sort of
liberal enlightenment, [which] seems likely to be the most suitable basis for [such] a
business man’s success’’ (Weber, 2005 [1930]:32).
Recently, the idea of economic development promoting individualism became
widespread in popular and academic thinking (Ball, 2001). By comparing the cash-
based blood supply system in the USA with the UK’s voluntary system, Titmuss
(1970) famously illustrated how the market exchange weakens cooperative norms of
behaviour and promotes rational individualism. Similarly, Inglehart (1997) went
beyond the question, ‘‘is economic growth due to cultural factors or does economic
growth somehow give rise to a culture that is facilitative to growth?’’ and argued
that economic prosperity and individualised worldviews are interconnected and
provide an explanation of why some societies are rich and others are poor. A recent
methodologically rigorous study by Tabellini (2010) demonstrates that among the
richest set of countries in Europe, individualism, as measured by confidence in
individual self-determination, has a positive causal effect on regional economic
development. Although in this article I do not test the links between economic
development and individualism as such, the association between economic
performance and individualised worldviews, and therefore individualised percep-
tions of poverty, is central to my hypothesis. The presented theoretical discussion
and empirical evidence allows me to speculate that economic development is
associated with the attitudes of socially mobile individuals towards poverty
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determinants, but it is also important that we do not ignore the measure of income
distribution that might also have a direct effect on popular explanations of why
some people are in need.
We cannot ascertain how income inequality is associated with perceptions of
popular explanations of poverty as existing theoretical framework and empirical
findings provide mixed evidence on this association. On the one hand, the high
levels of socio-economic disparities might be reflected in increased sensitivity to
social inequality with the resultant attitudes towards structural explanations of
poverty (Bucca, 2016) and stronger redistribution preferences (Meltzer & Richard,
1981). On the other hand, income inequality on the national level might be more
difficult to perceive than individuals’ own socio-economic conditions, and even if
they do understand the extend of income inequality, individuals might justify the
existing disparities in the distribution of economic rewards as just (Lepianka et al.,
2010; Shepelak & Alwin, 1986). The effect of income inequality of popular
explanations of poverty might be even more complicated in post-socialist societies.
From the beginning of the 1990s, the growing levels of income inequality in these
countries were mainly driven by two components of economic liberalisation such as
increasing differences in wage distribution in private and public sectors and reforms
in social benefits (Milanovic, 1999). Because the mix of these measures varied
across countries (see Gugushvili, 2015a), the association of income inequality with
perception of popular explanations of poverty might not be uniform in post-socialist
societies. Therefore, my second macro-level hypothesis only refers to the effect of
economic development:
H3: The effect of intergenerational social mobility on attitudes towards the
determinants of poverty is stronger in more economically developed societies than it
is in less economically developed societies.
Research Design
For the empirical test of the hypotheses, I use two datasets: European Values
Studies (EVS) and the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), which are analysed
separately. Both of these surveys provide nationally representative samples and are
widely used in comparative social research (see Cojocaru, 2014; De Regt, Smits, &
Mortelmans, 2012; Gugushvili, 2015a, b, 2016). Face-to-face interviews in each
country were conducted using a representative, multistage random sample of the
adult population. The total number of completed interviews stood at around 1500
and 1000 respondents per country, respectively, in EVS and LITS. Significant
efforts were undertaken to guarantee high scientific quality standards and to ensure
that the survey questions were appropriately standardised between countries.1
The 2008 wave of EVS (2010) provides detailed information on social origin as
well as occupational attainment and is used when looking at links between objective
social mobility and perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. I pool data for
1 For a more detailed description of EVS and LITS and regarding their methodological approaches,
consult the following website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) and report from EBRD (2010).
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all individuals of working age from 25 to 64 years in 20 Western European societies
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK) and 21 post-socialist countries that were the part of the
former socialist bloc (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia,
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
Ukraine). LITS was conducted in 2010 and includes information on subjective
social mobility (EBRD, 2010a). The same post-socialist societies are included in the
pooled analysis, but the LITS dataset only includes five Western European
countries—France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. Overall, 40,501 and
20,405 individuals qualify in EVS and LITS samples, but after list-wise deletion of
missing data 29,443 and 17,830 individuals remain for multivariate analysis. Most
of missing data come from objective and subjective social mobility variables as
described below, but I do not employ multiple imputation option to deal with data
missingness mainly because only a few control variables are used in regression
analysis.
Dependent and Independent Variables
The dependent variable of this article stems from the identical EVS and LITS
question about the main causes of poverty among individuals. The exact answer
options on a question about the main reason why some people are in need are: (1)
because of laziness and lack of willpower (individual blame), (2) because they have
been unlucky (individual fate), (3) it is an inevitable part of modern life (social fate),
and (4) because of injustice in our society (social blame). According to the
descriptive statistics in Table 1, the most frequently mentioned explanation of why
people are in need is injustice in society. In the EVS study, about two-fifths of
respondents believe that societal injustice is the main cause of poverty. In the LITS
survey that was conducted after the most severe consequences of the economic
crisis, more than half of the respondents believe that injustice is the main factor
contributing to why some people are in need. Laziness and lack of willpower are the
second most mentioned explanation why people are in need. In EVS, individual luck
is the least salient poverty attribution, and its share is even lower in LITS.
The main independent variables employed in this article are intergenerational
occupational mobility and respondents’ subjective perception of social mobility. For
objective social mobility, EVS gives information about the Standard International
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI). ISEI scores are generated
from ISCO88 codes (ILO, 2010) that are in turn derived from the following survey
questions: ‘‘What is/was the name or title of your main job?’’, ‘‘in your main job,
what kind of work do/did you do most of the time?’’ (Ganzeboom & Treiman,
1996). The main advantage of this schema is that it scales and hierarchically ranks
occupations according to the average level of education and job earnings
(Ganzeboom et al., 1992). There are several alternative ways to operationalise
social mobility according to respondents’ and their parents ISEI status. The most
straightforward approach entails subtracting respondents’ ISEI scores from their
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parents’ ISEI scores, which provides a continuous measure of social mobility that
then can be applied to various regression settings. LITS, however, only allows the
investigation of the categorical social mobility variable; hence, for comparability
concerns, I transformed the derived continuous variable through the subtraction of
respondents’ and their parents ISEI scores into a categorical measure of mobility
with five potential outcomes.2
ISEI scores vary from 16 to 90; those respondents who stayed within -5 and 5
margin of change in intergenerational ISEI score are coded as non-mobile. This is a
reasonable assumption because a ±5 change in ISEI score should not imply a
consequential transformation of a respondent’s occupational status. On the upper
end of mobility, those who increased ISEI within a range of 6–20 and 21–72,
respectively, were classified as upwardly mobile and strongly upwardly mobile.
2 In the unreported analysis, I tentatively employed the described continues measure of social mobility,
but the derived results were similar to those presented latter in this article.
Table 1 Attitudes towards the most important reason why some people are in need, the patterns of
objective and subjective mobility, and control variables. Source Author’s calculations based on data from
EVS (2010) and EBRD (2010b)
EVS LITS
Share/mean (SD) Share/mean (SD)
Dependent variable
Popular poverty explanations
Laziness 26.1% 20.4%
Unlucky 15.7% 9.9%
Part modern progress 21.6% 19.4%
Injustice in society 36.6% 50.3%
Independent variable
Intergenerational social mobility Objective Subjective
Strongly downward 7.9% 8.3%
Downward 16.3% 21.9%
Non-mobile 28.5% 24.3%
Upward 26.7% 35.6%
Strongly upward 20.7% 9.9%
Controls
Female 0.55 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49)
Age 44.3 (11.3) 44.3 (11.4)
Education 4.36 (1.27) 4.38 (1.41)
Labour market
Employed 68.2% 59.3%
Unemployed 9.8% 12.9%
Student 1.2% 0.5%
Retired 9.6% 11.6%
Other 11.3% 15.6%
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Those who had experienced a decrease within a margin of -6 to -20 and -21 to
-72, respectively, were classified as downwardly mobile and strongly downwardly
mobile. The proportion of missing data for respondents’ and their parents ISEI
scores are 9.1 and 17.2%, respectively. The missing rate varies across countries due
to idiosyncratic characteristics of national surveys, but this is unlikely to cause
systemic bias in the estimation of results (see GESIS, 2011).
Unlike EVS, social origin characteristics in LITS are restricted to parental
education. This means that the LITS dataset does not allow for the calculation of
measures of objective occupational mobility, but it includes a measure of subjective
intergenerational mobility. LITS asks respondents whether they agree or disagree
with the following statement: ‘‘I have done better in life than my parents’’. On a
5-point Likert scale, respondents can choose from ‘‘strongly disagree’’, ‘‘disagree’’,
‘‘neither disagree nor agree’’, ‘‘agree’’, and ‘‘strongly agree’’. Respondents are
further instructed to compare their parents’ position to their own when the former
were at the same age as respondents at the time of the interview. I transform the
answers from this question into five categorical variables: strongly dis-
agree = strongly downwardly mobile, disagree = downwardly mobile, neither
disagree nor agree = non-mobile, agree = upwardly mobile, and strongly
agree = strongly upwardly mobile. Information on subjective mobility is not
available for only 4.3% of respondents. Table 1 depicts the distribution of objective
and subjective social mobility. The main difference between these two modes of
social mobility is that individuals in LITS sample are less likely to describe
themselves as strongly upwardly mobile than individuals in EVS sample who have
experienced objective upgrading in occupation status.
Control Variables
I account for the identical control variables in the analysis of the effects of objective
and subjective social mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. In
the main analysis, control variables are limited to basic demographic and labour
market characteristics. The robustness check of the baseline models, described in
the results section, however, includes additional control variables. I employed an
array of socio-demographic variables that are expected to be associated with the
dependent variable: female, age, and age squared of respondents. The highest level
of completed education is based on the 1997 version of International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) from pre-primary = 1 to the second stage of
tertiary education = 7. Dummy variables for the following types of labour market
status were created: employed, unemployed, students, retired, and other labour
market status which serves as a reference category. Country fixed effects are used,
where appropriate, to account for country-specific characteristics in regression
models. Table 1 suggest that LITS dataset that includes more post-socialist societies
has a slightly higher share of female and a lower share of employed individuals due
to male household members being away and the higher unemployment rates
(EBRD, 2010b). There are virtually no missing data for respondents’ gender, age,
and education, while for employment characteristics, data are missing for about 0.5
and 0.1% of individuals, respectively, in EVS and LITS.
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Macro-level Variables
To account for the post-socialist legacy, I create a dummy variable for all countries
of the former socialist bloc. To test the effect of economic development, I use GDP
per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Data are in constant 2005
international dollars and are derived from the World Bank’s (2015) World
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Using the PPP-adjusted GDP indicator is
necessary because it allows cross-national comparison of economic development.
The descriptive statistics for this variable indicates that Western European countries
are much richer (mean GDP PPP capita USD 34.9 thousand [SD 10.7] in 2008 and
USD 37.0 thousand [SD 2.6] in 2010) than post-socialist societies (mean GDP PPP
capita USD 15.2 thousand [SD 7.1] in 2008 and USD 16.3 thousand [SD 6.9] in
2010), but within both groups, we observe significant variation in economic
development. Among various indicators of income inequality, the Standardised
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) seems to be the most appropriate for
comparative research (Solt, 2009). I use net Gini coefficients that show how the real
disposable incomes were distributed in these societies. The descriptive data suggest
that that by the end of 2000s, the mean Gini coefficient in Western European
countries was lower (mean Gini 0.29 [SD 0.03] in 2008 and 0.30 [SD 0.05] in 2010)
than in post-socialist societies (mean Gini 0.32 [SD 0.06] both in 2008 and 2010).
Methods
The survey question investigating perceptions of why some people are in need
includes categorical answer options that are best understood using multinomial
logistic models. Alternatively, for the robustness check of the latter method, I also run
linear probability models with binary dependent variables for each considered poverty
attribution. The results of this exercise were largely similar to the findings that are
reported in Results section, which increases my confidence in the appropriateness of
multinomial logistic approach. Model 1, shown below, is a general regression fitted to
observe associations between social mobility and the dependent variables. The
baseline models control for gender, age, age2, education, labour market status, and
country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered around countries.
Perceptions of popular explanations of povertyi
¼ b0 þ b1 genderi þ b2 agei þ b3 educationi
þ b4 labour market statusI þ b5 country dummiesi
þ b6 objective=subjective social mobilityi þ eij
ð1Þ
The main results are presented in predictive margins for individuals’ different
social mobility experiences. The ability to present results in predicted probabilities
is one of the main advantages of using multinomial logistic models for testing
Hypothesis 1 instead of multilevel multinomial regressions. The latter are used in
the empirical section to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 which imply that macro-level
contextual environment moderates the effect of social mobility on attitudes towards
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poverty explanations. I employ multilevel multinomial regression models that
consist of level 1 individual analysis and level 2 country contextual characteristics
of the legacy of socialist system, economic development, and income inequality,
and their cross-level interactions with objective and subjective social mobility.
Model 2 formally outlines the analytical strategy.
Perceptions of popular explanations of povertyi
¼ Model 1
zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{
þc1 post-socialismj
þ c2 economic developmentj þ c3 income inequalityj
þ
X3
l¼1 g1ðobjective=subjective social mobilityij
 ðpost-socialismj þ economic developmentj þ income inequalityjÞÞ
ð2Þ
The cross-level interaction effects gl indicate how contextual variables moderate
the relationship between intergenerational mobility and attitudes towards poverty
determinants. Multilevel analysis is performed in the Stata 13 statistical package
with the help of ‘‘gllamm’’ command’s multinomial function from its binomial
family of regressions. Because the interpretation of interaction terms in regression
models is often misleading (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006), I graphically
illustrate the marginal effect of social mobility and the corresponding standard
errors across a substantively meaningful range of the main contextual variables—
the post-socialist legacy and economic development.
Results
Multivariate Analysis
Based on the theoretical framework and Hypotheses 1, I expect that downwardly
mobile individuals are more likely to believe that external factors such as injustice
in society are the main determinants of poverty, while upwardly mobile individuals
should consider factors controlled by the individual such as laziness and a lack of
willpower to be more decisive determinants of life chances. Table 2 displays the
predicted margins of the corresponding explanations of poverty and their 95%
confidence intervals (CI) for upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile, and non-mobile
individuals. McFadden’s pseudo-R2 in models on both objective and subjective
social mobility explains about 5% of variation in the dependent variable. The
unreported marginal effects for control variables are in line with the previous
scholarship on covariates of perceptions of popular explanations of poverty.
Females are less likely to declare laziness and inevitability of life as explanations of
poverty, while they are more likely to select social injustice. The age of respondents
is negatively associated with the perception of laziness as the main cause of poverty.
More educated individuals have a lower probability of choosing laziness but are
more likely to name inevitability of modern life as an explanation of poverty. For
subjective mobility, the better educated are also less likely to name injustice in
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society than inevitability of modern life as a determinant of poverty. Furthermore,
unemployed tend to disregard lack of willpower but emphasise the role of social
injustice, while the opposite association is observed for employed individuals.
Now I move specifically to testing Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The upper half of
Table 2 shows the association of the various categories of occupational mobility
with the attributes of poverty. Overall, we do not see any statistically significant
links between objective social mobility and the dependent variable of this study.
The only instance for which social mobility experience has some association with
attitudes towards poverty determinants is shown in Column 4. In line with
Hypothesis 1b, strongly upwardly mobile individuals are marginally less likely to
explain poverty with social injustice (0.34, CI 95 0.33: 0.35) when compared to
strongly downwardly mobile individuals (0.38, CI 95 0.36: 0.40).
The lower half of Table 2 shows the association between subjective perception of
mobility and perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. The results confirm
Hypothesis 1 regarding subjective perception of mobility and its association with
attitudes towards the determinants of poverty. In Column 1, we can observe strong
links between subjective mobility and thinking that laziness and lack of willpower
are responsible for why people are in need. In line with Hypothesis 1a, the strongly
upwardly mobile group exhibits much higher chances of selecting this category of
poverty attribution (0.27, CI 95 0.25: 0.29) than do non-mobile (0.19, CI 95 0.18:
0.20) and downwardly mobile (0.16, CI 95 0.14: 0.18) individuals. The association
of subjective perception of mobility with the answer option on the role of luck in
Table 2 Objective and subjective social mobility and attitudes towards the most important reason why
some people are in need. Source Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2010) and EBRD
(2010b)
1. Laziness 2. They were
unlucky
3. Inevitability of
life
4. Injustice in
society
Objective mobility
Strongly
downward
0.25 (0.23–0.27) 0.15 (0.14–0.17) 0.22 (0.20–0.23) 0.38 (0.36–0.40)
Downward 0.26 (0.25–0.27) 0.14 (0.13–0.15) 0.23 (0.22–0.24) 0.36 (0.35–0.38)
Non-mobile 0.26 (0.25–0.27) 0.15 (0.14–0.16) 0.22 (0.22–0.23) 0.36 (0.35–0.37)
Upward 0.26 (0.25–0.27) 0.16 (0.15–0.17) 0.22 (0.21–0.23) 0.36 (0.35–0.37)
Strongly upward 0.27 (0.26–0.28) 0.15 (0.14–0.16) 0.23 (0.22–0.25) 0.34 (0.33–0.35)
Subjective mobility
Strongly
downward
0.16 (0.14–0.18) 0.08 (0.07–0.10) 0.16 (0.14–0.19) 0.59 (0.56–0.62)
Downward 0.16 (0.15–0.17) 0.10 (0.09–0.11) 0.19 (0.17–0.21) 0.55 (0.53–0.57)
Non-mobile 0.19 (0.18–0.20) 0.11 (0.10–0.11) 0.19 (0.18–0.21) 0.51 (0.50–0.53)
Upward 0.23 (0.22–0.24) 0.10 (0.09–0.10) 0.20 (0.19–0.21) 0.47 (0.46–0.49)
Strongly upward 0.27 (0.25–0.29) 0.10 (0.08–0.11) 0.20 (0.17–0.22) 0.44 (0.41–0.47)
Models control for respondents’ age, age2, gender, education, and labour market status, and country fixed
effects
Predictive margins (with 95% confidence intervals) from multinomial logistic models
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poverty is less clear. In Column 2, we observe an inverse U-shape effect. Both
strongly downward (0.08, CI 95 0.07: 0.10) and upward (0.10, CI 95 0.09: 0.10)
mobile individuals are less likely to claim that the poor have been unlucky than do
non-mobile individuals (0.11, CI 95 0.10: 0.11).
As regards the association between subjective perception of mobility and
believing that poverty is an inevitability of modern life, in Column 3 it is positive
and linear, but this effect is statistically significant only for strongly downwardly
mobile (0.16, CI 95 0.14: 0.19) individuals as opposed to that for upwardly mobile
individuals (0.20, CI 95 0.19: 0.21). Lastly, the clearest trend which emerges from
Table 2 is the association between subjective social mobility and perceiving social
injustice as the poverty determinant—Hypothesis 1b. Those individuals who declare
that they have experienced upward social mobility are significantly less likely to
think that injustice in society is to be blamed for people being in need. For instance,
non-mobile individuals are predicted to have a 51.2% (CI 95 49.8: 52.6) chance of
selecting this poverty attribution, while for the strongly upwardly mobile group, this
effect is about 7 percentage points lower (44.1, CI 95 41.4: 46.8). Furthermore,
strongly downwardly mobile individuals have about 0.59 (CI 95 0.56: 0.62)
probability of choosing social injustice as the primary poverty explanation. Overall,
it seems that subjective social mobility experience is indeed associated with
assigning poverty to individual and socio-structural explanations, while objective
mobility is not.
In order to check the robustness of the findings in Table 2, I run the described
models with an additional array of control variables that can potentially cancel out
or strengthen the observed association of social mobility with popular poverty
explanations (see Habibov, 2011; Kreidl, 2000; Smith & Mateˇju˚, 2012; Tooth &
Mishra, 2013). For objective intergenerational mobility these variables are: the size
of the town where the interviews were conducted, parental education, respondents’
occupational social class in the Erikson-Goldthorpe (EGP) class schema, and
monthly household income corrected for PPP in Euros. For subjective social
mobility, the following variables were added as additional controls: respondents’
type of settlement, parental education, respondents’ occupational attainment
grouped into white collar, blue collar, service, and farming occupational groups,
and the current socio-economic rung of respondents’ household on a ten-ladder
social hierarchy. After introducing the listed variables in multinomial logistic
models, the scale of the point estimates is marginally amended, but the substantive
and statistical significance observed in the main results remains unaffected.
Objective mobility remains an insignificant covariate of the dependent variable,
while subjective mobility is a strong predictor of perceptions of popular
explanations of poverty.
Multilevel Analysis
I start multilevel analysis with multilevel multinomial models in Table 2 that
account for respondents’ individual-level characteristics and macro-level variables
on the socialist legacy, economic development, and income inequality. I only
include dummy variables for upward and strongly upward mobility. In the latter
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specification, which simplifies the presentation of the cross-level interaction effects,
the reference category consists of downwardly and non-mobile individuals.
The results shown in odds ratios for objective mobility in Model 1, Table 3,
suggest that once country-level variables and other individual-level controls are
accounted for, strongly upwardly mobile individuals are 1.15 (p\ 0.01) and 1.09
(p\ 0.05) more likely to name laziness and inevitability of life as explanations of
poverty when compared to social injustice. These effects are much more
pronounced for subjective mobility in Model 2 in which both upward and strong
upward mobility is associated with a higher likelihood of selecting laziness (1.57,
p\ 0.01 and 1.94, p\ 0.01) and individuals’ luck (1.20, p\ 0.01 and 1.29,
p\ 0.01). Furthermore, all three contextual variables are associated with the
selection of specific explanations of poverty. In Model 1, individuals in post-
socialist societies are significantly less likely to explain poverty as the result of luck
(0.85, p\ 0.01) and inevitability of modern life (0.63, p\ 0.01) when compared to
social injustice. For subjective mobility in Model 2, individuals in countries with
high economic development are more likely to explain poverty with luck and
inevitability of life. In Model 1, GDP PPP per capita and the level of income
inequality are also associated with selecting laziness and lack of willpower as an
explanation of poverty, while in Model 2 the latter two contextual variables are,
respectively, positively and negatively associated with the lower propensity of
selecting luck as the main poverty attribute.
For testing Hypotheses 2 and 3, we have to look at the interaction effects between
social mobility and contextual variables in Table 4. Because an interpretation of the
main effects of interaction terms in regression models is often deceptive, for now I
only concentrate on the substantive and statistical significance of the presented
cross-level interactions. For objective mobility in Model 1, the results suggest that
socially mobile individuals in more unequal societies are less likely to declare that
poverty is the result of inevitability of life or individuals’ bad luck than that poverty
is caused by social injustice. Since the earlier research suggests that the level of
social mobility is negatively associated with income inequality (see Andrews &
Leigh, 2009; Jerrim & Macmillan, 2015), perhaps mobile individuals in countries
with high Gini coefficients are more aware of the structural conditions that hinder
their fellow citizens’ life chances. More telling cross-level interaction effects are
observed in Model 2. The results provide evidence that subjectively upwardly
mobile individuals in post-socialist societies are significantly more likely to explain
poverty as a consequence of individuals’ laziness and lack of willpower (for the
upwardly mobile OR is 1.5, p\ 0.05), inevitability of life (for the strongly
upwardly mobile OR is 2.7, p\ 0.05), and bad luck (for the strongly upwardly
mobile OR is 3.2, p\ 0.01) rather than injustice in society.
The second significant effect which we see in Model 2 (Table 4) is that, as
Hypothesis 3 suggests, a statistically significant association exists between
economic development and the effect of social mobility on the perception of
poverty attributes. First, the values of the interaction terms in Column III between
GDP PPP per capita and upward mobility (OR 1.2, p\ 0.05) and strong upward
mobility (OR 1.6, p\ 0.01) indicate that in more economically affluent societies,
upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to declare luck as the main explanation
416 Soc Just Res (2016) 29:402–428
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of poverty than social injustice. The corresponding interaction coefficient in
Column II reveals that strong upward mobility is associated with selecting
inevitability of life as an explanation of why some people are in need. In Column I,
Model 2, we also observe that upwardly mobile individuals in countries with higher
income inequality are more likely to choose laziness as the main attribute of
poverty.
Specific Effects of Post-socialism and Economic Development
As already mentioned, the direction and substantive significance of interaction
effects in nonlinear models cannot always be determined by examining regression
coefficients (see Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012). This is why I plot
interaction effects between subjective social mobility, the legacy of post-socialism,
and specific values of GDP PPP per capita. Figure 1(1) depicts marginal effects for
upward and strong upward mobility on the likelihood of preferring specific
explanation of poverty in post-socialist and other considered societies. We can see
that subjectively upwardly mobile individuals in post-socialist countries in
comparison with non-mobile individuals have significantly higher propensity to
select laziness and lack of willpower (0.08, CI 95 0.05: 0.10) than mobile
individuals in Western welfare democracies (0.02, CI 95: 0.01: 0.03). Furthermore,
Fig. 1c suggests that individuals who define themselves as upwardly mobile have
significantly lower propensity to select injustice in society as the main explanation
why some people are poor in post-socialist countries (-0.08, CI 95 -0.10: -0.06)
than in other societies included in the analysis (–0.01, CI 95 -0.03: 0.01).
In Fig. 1(2), I plot the effects of various GDP PPP per capita values on the
association between social mobility and perceptions of popular explanations of
poverty. The range of economic development from USD 5000 to USD 25,000
covers post-socialist societies, while the value of USD 35,000 is close to the mean
level of economic development in the analysed five Western European democracies.
Figure 1(2a) suggests that upwardly mobile individuals in countries with low GDP
PPP per capita levels such as Moldova and Georgia are predicted to be about 1% (CI
95 0.28: 1.49) more likely than non-mobile and downwardly mobile individuals to
prefer laziness and the main poverty explanation, while this effect is about 6% (CI
95 2.30: 8.79) in countries with GDP PPP per capita level of about USD 25,000 such
as Slovakia and Czech Republic. On the other hand, in countries with GDP PPP per
capita of more than USD 20,000 strongly upwardly mobile individuals are about 6%
(CI 95 -7.34: -4.03) less likely than downward and non-mobile individuals to
select injustice in society as the main poverty attribute. This effect is non-significant
in countries with a low level of economic development of about USD 10,000 PPP
per capita such as Albania or Ukraine. The results presented in Fig. 1(2) also
indicate that the moderating effect of economic development is insignificant in the
most affluent societies of our sample, all of which are Western welfare democracies.
Although I identified that in post-socialist societies among socially mobile
individuals, perceptions of popular explanations of poverty vary when compared to
other countries, the findings of the study using a sample of 21 post-socialist nations
might differ if separate country groups are analysed. There are major differences
Soc Just Res (2016) 29:402–428 419
123
0.10 0.000.08 0.06 0.04 0.02
O
th
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
P
os
t-s
oc
ia
lis
t
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
La
zi
ne
ss
0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
O
th
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
P
os
t-s
oc
ia
lis
t
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
Th
ey
 w
er
e 
un
lu
ck
y
0.00 -0.020.04 0.02
O
th
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
P
os
t-s
oc
ia
lis
t
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
In
ev
ita
bi
lit
y 
of
 li
fe
0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10
O
th
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
P
os
t-s
oc
ia
lis
t
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
In
ju
st
ic
e 
in
 s
oc
ie
ty
(1
)  
P
os
t-s
oc
ia
lis
t l
eg
ac
y 
an
d 
up
w
ar
d 
m
ob
ili
ty
00.15 0.10 0.05 -0.05 -0.10
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
35
00
0
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
La
zi
ne
ss
-.040.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03-0.02
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
35
00
0
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
Th
ey
 w
er
e 
un
lu
ck
y
0.10 0.05 -0.05 -0.100.00
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
35
00
0
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
In
ev
ita
bi
lit
y 
of
 li
fe
0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
25
00
0
35
00
0
U
pw
ar
d
S
tro
ng
ly
 u
pw
ar
d
In
ju
st
ic
e 
in
 s
oc
ie
ty
(2
)  
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 u
pw
ar
d 
m
ob
ili
ty
(a
) 
(b
) 
(c
) 
(d
) 
(d
) 
(c
) 
(b
) 
(a
) 
F
ig
.
1
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
o
f
su
b
je
ct
iv
e
u
p
w
ar
d
m
o
b
il
it
y
o
n
p
o
p
u
la
r
ex
p
la
n
at
io
n
s
o
f
w
h
y
so
m
e
p
eo
p
le
ar
e
in
n
ee
d
co
n
d
it
io
n
ed
b
y
so
ci
al
is
t
le
g
ac
y
an
d
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
N
o
te
s
B
a
rs
g
iv
e
9
5
%
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
.
M
ar
g
in
al
ef
fe
ct
s
d
er
iv
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
th
e
sa
m
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
as
in
T
ab
le
4
.
S
o
u
rc
e
A
u
th
o
r’
s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
as
ed
o
n
d
at
a
fr
o
m
E
B
R
D
(2
0
1
0
b
)
an
d
W
o
rl
d
B
an
k
(2
0
1
5
)
420 Soc Just Res (2016) 29:402–428
123
between post-socialist societies both in the geographical location and their histories
and cultural proximity to the European tradition and the degree to which they were
dependent on the Soviet Union with the corresponding autonomy of tolerating
private property and entrepreneurship (Gijsberts, 2002), all of which can affect
perceptions of popular explanations of poverty. Furthermore, available evidence
suggests that public beliefs regarding the causes of poverty significantly diverge
within post-socialist countries (Habibov, 2011; Murthi & Tiongson, 2009). There
have been attempts to incorporate post-socialist societies into a welfare state
typology (Aidukaite, 2009; Fenger, 2007; Gugushvili, 2010, 2015b) and the
varieties of capitalism frameworks (Adam, Kristan, & Tomsˇic, 2009; Bohle &
Greskovits, 2012). The problem with using the latter classifications is that they
generally cover only a small portion of the countries. In addition, the links between
these approaches, social mobility regimes, and perceptions of popular explanations
of poverty are not clear.
To understand the observed differences in the effect of social mobility in specific
groups of post-socialist societies, I use a categorisation derived from the annual
Transitional Reports of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), in which economic reforms are described separately in (1) Central Europe
and the Baltic states—Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; (2) South-Eastern Europe—Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia; and (3) non-Baltic former Soviet
Union—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. In
the unreported analysis (available upon request), I interacted coefficients between
upward social mobility and specific post-socialist country groups derived from
models which are identical to those shown in Table 4. The results suggest that the
differences found between country groups are not salient. It seems, however, that
the strongest effect of social mobility is observed in Central European post-socialist
societies where both upward and strongly upwardly mobile groups are more likely
to select the option on inevitability of life rather than social injustice as the main
poverty explanation. It might be a possibility that mobile individuals in the countries
of Central Europe and the Baltic region are different from mobile individuals in
other post-socialist societies due to their varying exposure to communism and the
resultant differences in individualistic attitudes.
Discussion
In this article, I analysed how social mobility experience associates with perceptions
of popular explanations of poverty. My micro-level hypothesis implied those who
experience upward social mobility are more likely than non-mobile individuals to
make internal dispositions that are reflected in attitudes towards the determinants of
poverty. It is assumed that individuals start with an initial set of attitudes that are
amended according to their personal experience of social mobility and the self-
serving bias in perceptions about the role of ascribed and attained factors related to
success or failure. I also looked on the consequences of both objective and
subjective social mobility for the perceptions of poverty determinants.
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In line with the proposed hypotheses, substantive results demonstrate that
downwardly mobile individuals are more likely and upwardly mobile less likely, to
explain poverty by external factors such as societal injustice. One of the central
findings of this article is that what really matters in the formation of attitudes is not
an objective occupational upgrade which conventionally measures social mobility in
the social stratification literature, but rather how people perceive their own mobility
experience. This is well aligned with an observation made by Lipset (1992) that
subjective feelings about mobility are more important for political attitudes than
objective intergenerational upgrade of occupational status. The same findings have
been reported in the earlier literature on status inconsistency (Baer, Eitzen, Duprey,
Thompson, & Cole, 1976). Psychological explanations of this tendency are that
individuals tend to filter their objective environment in order to derive their
subjective perceptions of the world and their own experiences (Wolf, 1978).
Furthermore, inconsistencies between subjective perception of mobility and
objective mobility experience might be attributed to people’s tendency to consider
their own success in broader terms than occupational attainment. In a study
conducted in France, when asked whether labour market status was the main feature
of their life success, more than half of the respondents provided a negative answer
(Duru-Bellat & Kieffer, 2008).
Nonetheless, the employed data and methods do not allow us to unequivocally
assert that the observed associations are the result of the self-serving bias in causal
attribution mechanism. We cannot exclude the possibility of reverse causation in the
reported association as attitudes towards poverty explanations might affect
individuals’ social mobility experience. EVS and LITS are separate surveys,
conducted at different times. They are not longitudinal datasets and do not allow for
the following of individuals across their life courses for detecting the effect of social
mobility. It could be that upwardly mobile individuals had the same attitudes before
they experienced mobility and that individualistic personalities helped them to
succeed in life. Although I cannot address this problem, most of the existing studies
on the consequences of intergenerational social mobility face similar constraints.
Furthermore, the findings from several longitudinal and experimental studies
suggest that changes in attitudes do occur over time and along with individuals’ real
or perceived social mobility experiences (Clark & D’Angelo, 2010; Marshall &
Firth, 1999; Shariff, Wiwad, & Aknin, 2016).
Next, with the outlined macro-level hypotheses, I expected that people from post-
socialist societies and more economically developed economies are more likely than
people from other European and economically less prosperous societies to explain
performance by factors that are internal to themselves. Based on the previous
research and judgement of some of the leading scholars of social thought, I made an
assumption that societies with the legacy of socialism and countries with the
advanced level of economic development both have a high propensity to
individualise hardship. Socially mobile individuals are therefore more likely to
attribute failure to self-determining factors. My findings indicate that the socialist
legacy and economic development indeed significantly moderate the effect of
subjective social mobility on the perception that poverty is caused by laziness or
societal injustice. It might be true that in affluent societies people are more likely to
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believe that everyone has a high opportunity for success, but this does not explain
why differences between mobile and non-mobile individuals vary cross-nationally.
With the utilised data and methods, nonetheless, it is problematic to assert that the
considered macro-level factors are causally responsible for the diverse implications
of social mobility on perceptions of popular explanations of poverty.
The findings of this study could contribute to the theoretical development of the
social justice research. For instance, the social bases of support for certain
distributive principles is well acknowledged by scholars in justice area (Deutsch,
1975; Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, & Levanon, 2003; Shirazi & Biel, 2005), but they do
not usually consider the role of life-long learning. Individuals acquire values and
beliefs at a relatively young age when they are entering adulthood from the content
of formal and informal education, the distinctive developments of their birth cohorts
through peer group socialisation, and idiosyncratic historical experiences such as
war, revolution, or mass migration (Jennings & Markus, 1984; Ryder, 1965).
Nonetheless, socially mobile individuals, by virtue of moving to a higher or a lower
social class, acquire new values and preferences similar to those of the destination
class (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995). The field of social justice research
would benefit to acknowledge that the values of intergenerationally mobile
individuals are affected by interaction with individuals from the host class and
reflect the values of this normative reference group (Heath, Jowell, & Curtice,
1985), but this acquisition is likely to happen gradually, in a process that Blau
(1956) refers to as the ‘‘pattern of acculturation’’.
Lastly, assuming that the results of this study at least partially reflect reality, it is
interesting to consider the implications of social mobility for public and social
policies and political and economic systems. My answer to the question can be only
speculative. First, it is known that the levels of objective social mobility across
countries do not dramatically vary (Breen, 2004; Gugushvili, 2014), and, as I find in
the current article, this type of mobility does not exert a particularly strong
association with attitudes, whereas subjective social mobility has much stronger
links with attitudes towards the determinants of poverty. Subjective experience of
intergenerational mobility might be particularly relevant in post-socialist societies
because the economic recession of the 1990s generated much stronger changes in
the perception of subjective mobility than was the case in terms of objective
occupational mobility. It is also known that subjective social mobility is closely
related to an individual’s current socio-economic status (Kelley & Kelley, 2009).
The latter might imply that in more economically developed societies, socially
mobile individuals are less likely to support income distribution and policies that
help the poor. Therefore, social mobility and resultant attitudes about poverty can
create a vicious circle in which an increase in the former leads to more negative
perceptions of people in need. The latter can be an exciting topic for future
longitudinal and experimental research on the link between intergenerational social
mobility and social justice.
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